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IMMERSION REVISITED: A REVIEW OF EXISTING 
DEFINITIONS OF IMMERSION AND THEIR RELATION TO 
DIFFERENT THEORIES OF PRESENCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: The term immersion continues to be applied inconsistently within and across 
different fields of research connected with the study of virtual reality and interactive media. 
Moreover, immersion is oftentimes used interchangeably with the terms presence and 
engagement. This article details a review of existing definitions of immersion originating 
within the study of video games, virtual environments, and literary works of fiction. Based 
on this review, a three-dimensional taxonomy of the various conceptualizations of 
immersion is proposed. That is, the existing definitions of immersion may be broadly 
divided into three categories, each representing a dimension of the taxonomy: immersion 
as a property of a system, a subjective response to narrative contents, or a subjective 
response to challenges within the virtual environment. Finally, four distinct theories of 
presence are introduced and, based on the established taxonomy, we discuss how the 
individual theories relate to existing definitions of immersion. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
It seems reasonable to assume that most people will find it relatively trivial to explain the 
meaning of the concept immersion in relation to an object being submerged into a body of fluid. 
However, the same unambiguity does not exist when the term is used in relation to a user’s 
experience of media, such as the experience of virtual reality (VR). Following Blascovich and 
Bailenson (2011), we use the term virtual reality in a broad sense to describe any form of 
mediated reality and reserve the term virtual environment (VE) for systems relying on high 
fidelity tracking and displays to facilitate natural perception and interaction within an artificial 
environment. Indeed, McMahan suggested that immersion has become “an excessively vague, 
all-inclusive concept” (McMahan, 2003, p. 63). The term has come to stand for a multitude of 
different types of experiences and it is oftentimes used more or less interchangeably with 
concepts such as presence, involvement, and engagement (e.g., Lombard & Ditton, 1997; 
McMahan, 2003; Ryan, 2003). The inconsistent usage of the term immersion in definitions 
proposed by researchers probably has been exacerbated by the fact that it has been applied 
within a variety of domains. These domains include, but are not limited to, VE research (Slater, 
2003; Witmer & Singer, 1998), video game studies (Adams & Rollings, 2006; Brown & Cairns, 
2004; McMahan, 2003), film studies (Rooney, Benson, & Hennessy, 2012; Visch, Tan, & 
Molenaar, 2010), music studies (Dura, 2006; Ihde, 2007), and research dealing with linear and 
interactive works of literary fiction (Ryan, 2003). Furthermore, according to Lombard and 
Ditton (1997), the concept of presence has gained interest within a range of academic 
disciplines, including communication, cognitive science, computer science, engineering, 
philosophy, psychology, and the arts. The VE research and video game studies domains are 
particularly relevant because the two fields seemingly are converging (Zyda, 2005).  
The problem of inconsistent usage of the term immersion is twofold: The term has 
become diluted due to inconsistent usage, and the interchanged use of this and other terms 
may potentially confound the study of concepts such as presence that has been, and continues 
to be, regarded as central in relation to the study and application of VEs (Zahorik & Jenison, 
1998). Consequently, through our research documented in the current paper, we sought to 
explore two questions: What meanings are associated with the term immersion and how do 
these meanings map onto existing views of presence? This paper provides readers with a 
review of the range of various meanings associated with the term immersion and clarifies 
how these views of immersion relate to different theories of presence. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, we present a review of four 
general views of immersion: immersion as a property of the system used to display the virtual 
world, immersion as a perceptual response to that system, immersion as a response to 
narrative contents, and immersion as a response to challenges within the virtual world. This 
section is concluded with the introduction of a three-dimensional taxonomy of the different 
conceptualizations of immersion. Subsequently, we introduce four different theories of 
presence and discuss how the three dimensions of the taxonomy relate to the individual 
notions of presence. Finally, we present implications of our research and summarize and 
conclude upon the discussion detailed throughout the paper. 
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METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 
In order to explore what meanings are associated with the term immersion and how these 
meanings related to existing views of presence, a narrative literature review (Cook, Mulrow, 
& Haynes, 1997) was performed. Thus, unlike critical reviews, the selection of sources did 
not involve a comprehensive search of all potentially relevant work based on reproducible 
criteria. Instead, the review of literature related to immersion was based on relatively well-
known articles from dissimilar fields of study. That is, most of the selected articles have been 
cited more than 100 times and originate from VE research, video game studies, and research 
on linear and interactive works of literary fiction. For each of the conceptualizations of 
immersion we identified its relation to form, content, and the response of the user. The four 
theories of presence similarly originated from fairly well-known articles. Moreover, these 
four theories were selected because they represent different views of how presence relates to 
form, content, and the user’s response. The limitations of adopting this approach are 
discussed in the concluding section of the paper.   
 
 
CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF IMMERSION 
 
In her frequently cited book, Hamlet on the Holodeck, Murray (1997) provided the following 
description of immersion that both explained the term’s origins and implicitly highlighted the 
reason for its ambiguous usage: 
Immersion is a metaphorical term derived from the physical experience of being 
submerged in water. We seek the same feeling from a psychologically immersive 
experience that we do from a plunge in the ocean or swimming pool: the sensation of 
being surrounded by a completely other reality, as different as water is from air, that 
takes over all of our attention, our whole perceptual apparatus. (Murray, 1997, p. 98) 
The general consensus seems to be that immersion involves being or feeling surrounded by 
something (e.g., Ermi & Mäyrä, 2005; McMahan, 2003; Ryan 2003; Slater, 2003; Witmer & 
Singer, 1998). However, a number of alternate propositions address what it is that surrounds the 
individual. One of the most prominent differences between existing views of immersion is the 
distinction between immersion as technology and immersion as a subjective experience. To use 
Murray’s water metaphor, some believe immersion to be an expression of how deeply one is 
submerged into a body of fluid, while others believe it to be the subjective experience of being 
submerged. More specifically, it seems reasonable to distinguish between four general views of 
immersion: (a) immersion as a property of the system used to present the virtual world; (b) 
immersion as a perceptual response to that system; (c) immersion as a response to an unfolding 
narrative, the characters inhabiting the story world, or the depiction of the world itself; and (d) 
immersion as a response to challenges demanding the use of one’s intellect or sensorimotor 
skills. Throughout the following subsections, we present a review of these definitions of 
immersion. The definitions have been organized based on whether they qualify as a property of 
the system, a perceptual response, a response to narratives, or a response to challenges. The 
definitions are summarized in Table 1. It should be stressed that several of the cited authors 
adhere to multidimensional views of immersion, such as the one we propose. 
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Table 1.  Summary of the Presented Definitions of Immersion. 
Authors 
A property of 
the system 
A perceptual 
response 
A response to 
narratives 
A response to 
challenges 
Slater 
(2003) 
 
System immersion: A 
property of the technology 
mediating the experience. 
The higher the fidelity of 
displays and tracking,  
the greater the level of 
immersion. 
   
Witmer 
and 
Singer 
(1998) 
 Immersion: A feeling of 
being enveloped by, 
included in, & interacting 
with the virtual 
environment. 
  
Arsenault 
(2005) 
 
 Sensory immersion:  
A sensation of being 
enveloped by the 
multisensory 
representation of the 
virtual world delivered via 
high-fidelity displays. 
Fictional immersion: 
The sensation of being 
mentally absorbed by 
fictional stories, worlds  
or characters. 
 
Systemic immersion: 
The mental absorption 
experienced when facing 
challenges that match 
one’s capabilities, 
including the challenges 
involved when exposed to 
nonparticipatory media. 
McMahan 
(2003) 
 Perceptual immersion: 
The sensation of being 
surrounded by the virtual 
environment that 
increases proportionally 
with the number of 
modalities provided with 
artificial stimuli. 
Psychological 
immersion (immersion 
on a diegetic level): The 
mental absorption 
experienced during 
exposure to the world  
of a game’s story. 
Engagement 
(immersion on a 
nondiegetic level): The 
state of focused attention 
on the game brought 
about by the desire for 
gaining points and/or 
devising a winning or 
spectacular strategy. 
Adams 
and 
Rollings 
(2006) 
 
  Narrative immersion: 
A state of intense and 
focused attention on the 
story world & the unfolding 
events and acceptance of 
these as real. 
Strategic and tactical 
immersion: A state of 
intense preoccupation with 
observation, calculation, & 
planning or with swift 
responses to obstacles. 
Ermi and 
Mäyrä 
(2005) 
 
 Sensory immersion:  
The feeling of being 
surrounded by the 
multisensory 
representation of virtual 
worlds delivered through 
large screens and 
powerful sounds. 
Imaginative immersion: 
The sensation of being 
mentally absorbed by a 
game’s story, its world, or 
its characters. 
Challenge-based 
immersion: The mental 
absorption experienced 
when facing challenges 
requiring mental or motor 
skills. 
Ryan 
(2003; 
2008) 
  Narrative immersion: A 
state of intense focus on a 
narrative; can be divided 
into 3 subcategories: 
immersion (elicited by a 
strong sense of place and 
the joy of exploration), 
temporal immersion 
(caused by a desire to 
know what will happen 
next), and emotional 
immersion (brought about 
by emotional attachment 
to characters). 
Ludic immersion: 
A state of intense 
absorption in the task 
currently being 
performed. 
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Immersion as Technology or the Experience of Technological Envelopment 
 
In relation to the study of VEs, the term immersion has been used to describe both the technology 
surrounding the user and the user’s response to being surrounded by technology. Slater (2003), a 
proponent of the former view, provided the following account of his view of immersion: 
Let’s reserve the term “immersion” to stand simply for what the technology delivers 
from an objective point of view. The more that a system delivers displays (in all sensory 
modalities) and tracking that preserves fidelity in relation to their equivalent real-world 
sensory modalities, the more that it is “immersive.” (Slater, 2003, “Immersion and 
Presence,” para. 1)  
Immersion is therefore regarded as an objectively measurable property of the system and not 
the product of the user’s reaction to being enveloped by technology (Slater, 2003). Henceforth, 
we will use the term system immersion (Slater, 1999) when referring to this conceptualization 
of immersion. 
Proponents of the second view of immersion include Witmer and Singer (1998), who argued 
that, in relation to VEs, immersion may be viewed as a “psychological state characterized by 
perceiving oneself to be enveloped by, included in, and interacting with an environment that 
provides a continuous stream of stimuli and experiences” (Witmer & Singer, 1998, p. 227). 
Following this view, the subjective experience of immersion is influenced by at least three 
factors: (a) the extent to which the user is isolated from the external physical environment, (b) the 
sense of self-inclusion within the mediated environment, and (c) egocentric motion perception 
and the ability to interact naturally with the environment. It is worth noting that Witmer and 
Singer (1998) distinguished between immersion and involvement. The former relates to the 
sensation of being enveloped by the environment and the latter refers to the act of assigning great 
focus and attention to perceived stimuli and occurring events. Similar conceptualizations have 
been used to describe immersion in relation to video games. McMahan (2003) distinguished 
between perceptual immersion and psychological immersion that correspond to attentional 
surrender caused by system immersion and captivating stories and spaces, respectively. 
Particularly, McMahan described that perceptual immersion is “accomplished by blocking as 
many of the senses as possible to the outside world and making it possible for the user to perceive 
only the artificial world, by the use of goggles, headphones, gloves, and so on” (McMahan, 2003, 
p. 77). In a similar vein, Ermi and Mäyrä (2005) introduced the concept sensory immersion, 
referring to the audiovisual presentation of games. The authors described sensory immersion as 
follows:  
Digital games have evolved into audiovisually impressive, three-dimensional and 
stereophonic worlds that surround their players in a very comprehensive manner. Large 
screens close to the player’s face and powerful sounds easily overpower the sensory 
information coming from the real world, and the player becomes entirely focused on the 
game world and its stimuli. (Ermi & Mäyrä, 2005, p. 43)  
Based on the presented definitions of immersion, it would seem that proponents of both 
views hold that immersion may be closely connected to media form, that is, the properties of 
the technological system used to mediate the experience. However, the fundamental difference 
is that immersion following one view is regarded as a property of media form, while the other 
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view stipulates that immersion corresponds to the subjective experience of the media form. 
Table 2 summarizes the two opposing views of immersion outlined in the preceding paragraph. 
 
Immersion as a Response to Narratives  
 
When discussing immersion in relation to video games, McMahan (2003) distinguished 
between the sensations of being immersed on a diegetic level versus a nondiegetic level. The 
diegetic level refers to the level of the game’s diegesis, that is, the fictional world in which the 
events of the unfolding narrative occurs (Prince, 2003). When immersed in a game on a 
diegetic level (i.e., psychological immersion), the player is mentally preoccupied by the world 
of the game’s story (McMahan, 2003). Adams and Rollings (2006) conceptualized immersive 
experiences in a similar manner and have dubbed players’ immersion with a game’s story as 
narrative immersion. Narrative immersion is defined as “the feeling of being inside a story, 
completely involved and accepting the world and events of the story as real” (Adams & 
Rollings, 2006, p. 30). Notably, a number of alternate definitions exist that resemble this one, 
albeit under different names. These include imaginative immersion proposed by Ermi and 
Mäyrä (2005) and Arsenault’s (2005) slightly modified notion of fictional immersion. In short, 
Arsenault discarded the label imaginative in favor of fictional based on the argument that this 
form of immersion needs not be explicitly dependent upon the imagination of the individual. 
According to Adams and Rollings (2006), an exhilarating plot, interesting character, and 
dramatic situations are prerequisites for the experience of narrative immersion. Thus, the term 
immersion has been used beyond descriptions of experiences elicited by interactive VR. Ryan 
(2003) described how reading may give rise to narrative immersion. Even though Ryan used 
the act of reading as her point of departure, she did not reserve immersion for experiences of 
nonparticipatory media. That is, narrative immersion may arise from any narrative work, 
including digital games where the user assumes control of the story’s protagonist or antagonist. 
Thus, Ryan’s conceptualization is similar to the one proposed by Adams and Rollings (2006). 
However, Ryan provided an even more detailed account of what causes individuals to become 
immersed by narratives. Narrative immersion may be described in terms of the three 
subcategories: temporal, spatial and emotional. Even though her description of the three has  
 
Table 2.  Immersion as Technology and Immersion as a Reaction to Technological Envelopment  
in Terms of Form, Content, and User Response. 
Terms Form Content User response 
System immersion (e.g., 
Slater, 2003) 
A property of media form 
describing the degree to 
which a system is able to 
faithfully reproduce natural 
perception and action 
through multisensory 
displays and tracking. 
System immersion is 
separate from content 
because it is used to 
describe the technology 
used to present the content 
rather than the content itself.  
Although system immersion 
may influence the user 
response, the reverse is  
not true. 
Immersion (Witmer & 
Singer, 1998), perceptual 
immersion (McMahan, 2003) 
and sensory immersion 
(Ermi & Mäyrä, 2005). 
Form factors, such as 
isolation from the physical 
environment and interfaces 
allowing for natural 
interaction, are believed 
 to influence the experience 
of immersion. 
Content is generally not 
viewed as a factor 
influencing the subjective 
sensation of immersion. 
Immersion is view as a 
sensation of being 
enveloped by, included in, 
and interacting with an 
environment 
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its roots in reading experiences, it may be pertinent to other forms of VR. Arsenault (2005) 
proposed that the three forms of immersion potentially could be used as subcategories of 
fictional immersion. Just as Adams and Rollings (2006) suggested that exhilarating plots are 
constituent to the experience of narrative immersion, so did Ryan (2003). She called temporal 
immersion the involvement brought about by the individual’s desire to learn what will happen 
next. In other words, temporal immersion may be defined as “the reader’s involvement in the 
process by which the progression of narrative time distills the field of potential, selecting one 
branch as the actual, confining the others to the realm of forever virtual” (Ryan, 2003, p. 141). 
Spatial immersion refers to the form of immersion brought about by the individual’s response to 
the depicted location or scenery (Ryan 2003). It involves having a sense of place as well as the 
pleasure experienced when one is exploring the virtual space (Ryan, 2008). When discussing 
spatial immersion in relation to textual narratives, Ryan stated that, in its most complete form, 
“the reader’s private landscapes blend with the textual geography. In those moments of sheer 
delight, the reader develops an intimate relation to the setting as well as a sense of being present 
on the scene of the represented events” (Ryan 2003, p. 122). Lastly, emotional immersion refers 
to the experience of immersion resulting from the reader’s emotional investment in the fate of 
the protagonists or antagonists of the narrative (Ryan 2003). Ryan argued that this form of 
immersion is achievable because of the mind’s capacity for simulating incredibly vivid emotions 
even when their causes are not real.  
Following the outlined definitions of immersion, it would appear that narrative immersion 
and its subcategories (temporal, spatial, and emotional) are characterized by a degree of mental 
absorption or intense preoccupation with the story, the diegetic space, and the characters 
inhabiting this space. Thus, narrative immersion is largely the product of the mediated content. 
Furthermore, when discussing spatial immersion, Ryan (2003) suggested that the media form 
also may be influential. According to Ryan (2003), pictorial media are able to instantaneously 
transport the viewer into the diegetic space. Textual media, on the other hand, involve a more 
gradual transition into the story world. This implies that the experience of spatial immersion 
accompanying exposure to high-fidelity displays resembles perceptual immersion (McMahan, 
2003) and sensory immersion (Ermi & Mäyrä, 2005). Thus, spatial immersion may be 
influenced by both form and contents (i.e., system immersion may contribute to the sensation 
of spatial immersion). Table 3 summarizes the definitions of immersion pertaining to the 
experience of immersion brought about by exposure to narratives.  
 
Immersion as a Response to Challenges  
 
In addition to viewing immersion as the outcome of exposure to narratives, Ryan (2008) also 
acknowledged that immersion may arise from the experience of VRs devoid of explicit 
narrative contents. She referred to this form of immersion as ludic immersion and described it 
as an intense focus on the performance of a given task, akin to the intensity exhibited by some 
professional classical musicians. McMahan described immersion on a nondiegetic level as the 
player’s love for the game and the strategy it requires to play it (McMahan, 2003, p. 68). Ermi 
and Mäyrä referred to this form of immersion as challenge-based immersion and described it as 
“the feeling of immersion that is at its most powerful when one is able to achieve a satisfying 
balance of challenges and abilities” (Ermi & Mäyrä, 2005, p. 43). Notably, they argued that this 
feeling of immersion may be brought about by challenges to both sensorimotor and mental skills. 
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Table 3.  Immersion as a Reaction to Narratives in Terms of Form, Content, and User Response. 
Terms Form Content User response 
Narrative immersion (Adams 
& Rollings, 2006; Ryan 2003), 
imaginative immersion (Ermi 
& Mäyrä, 2005) and fictional 
immersion (Arsenault, 2005) 
May be experienced across 
different types of media 
May result from exposure to 
the events, characters, and 
world of an unfolding 
narrative 
Characterized by a mental 
absorption with the mediated 
narrative 
Temporal immersion (Ryan, 
2003) 
May be experienced across 
different types of media 
Results from expose to the 
unfolding events, i.e., the 
plot 
Characterized by an intense 
preoccupation with the 
narrative due to a strong 
desire to know what will 
happen next 
Spatial immersion (Ryan, 
2003) 
May be experienced across 
different types of media, but 
pictorial media is particularly 
effective at eliciting this form 
of immersion 
Results from exposure to the 
depiction of the narrative 
space 
Characterized by an intense 
preoccupation with the 
narrative accompanied by a 
strong sense of place and 
the pleasure of exploring the 
environment 
Emotional immersion (Ryan, 
2003) 
May be experienced across 
different types of media 
Results from the experience 
of the depicted characters 
Characterized by an intense 
preoccupation with the 
narrative due to a strong 
emotional investment in the 
fate of the protagonists or 
antagonists of the narrative 
 
However, the two authors are of the belief that the challenges more often than not will pertain to 
both conditions to some degree. Whereas the simultaneous occurrence of both types of challenges 
is possible, one may argue that one of two conditions has to be met in order for the challenges to 
be experienced as immersive. Either the simultaneous occurrence of the challenges has to be brief 
enough to avoid attentional overload, or the user needs to be so proficient at tackling one of the 
two skills that he or she has the attentional surplus necessary to face the second one. That is, 
either task switching must be possible, or one of the two competing tasks has to be automated 
(Saariluoma, 2005). With these arguments in mind, it seems reasonable to distinguish between 
the immersion engendered by challenges to the user’s motor or his/her mental skills. 
Adams and Rollings (2006) made exactly this distinction when describing the two forms of 
immersion: strategic immersion and tactical immersion. The former refers to the experience of 
being intensely preoccupied with trying to win the game. In other words, when strategically 
immersed, the player is almost entirely preoccupied with the optimization of choices and 
therefore ignores elements such as the story and characters (Adams & Rollings, 2006, p. 30). 
Thus, strategic immersion results from a player’s intense preoccupation with observation, 
calculation, and planning. Tactical immersion refers to the form of immersion experienced when 
playing hectic action games where continuous demands for reactions to occurring obstacles give 
rise to complete attentional surrender. Particularly, repeated confrontation with relatively small 
and similar challenges requires the player’s undivided attention, leaving no time for focusing on 
other elements of the game, such as the general strategy or story (Adams & Rollings, 2006, p. 
30). Notably, these definitions of immersion greatly resemble the experience of flow 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990), which also describes the experience of playing video games (Chen, 
2007). Flow arises when an individual performs an activity of interest in which the perceived 
challenges correspond to the perceived skills. The state of flow is characterized by intense and 
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focused attention, the merging of action and awareness, the loss of self-consciousness, a sense 
of control, a distortion in temporal experience, and the experience of the activity as being 
intrinsically rewarding (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2005). Considering that challenge-
based immersion is most intense when the balance between challenges and skills is maintained, 
both strategic and tactical immersion may be accompanied by a subjective response similar to 
the state of flow.  
Thus, the types of immersion outlined in this subsection may be characterized by intense 
focus and attention brought about by the need for physical reactions to occurring obstacles or 
cognitive demands. Moreover, this implies that these types of immersion are influenced to a 
large extent by the mediated content because the challenges themselves are shaped by the 
subject matter. Even though the cited authors do not explicitly address the role of media form, it 
does seem likely that it also influences challenge-based immersion. For example, the display’s 
field of view—the vertical and horizontal angles subtended by the visual display (Steinicke et 
al., 2011)—is believed to influence a variety of aspects of human performance and perception, 
including, but not limited to, navigation performance in real and virtual environments (Hassan, 
Hicks, Lei, & Turano, 2007; Jansen, Toet, & Delleman, 2010; Toet, Jansen, & Delleman, 
2007), self-motion perception (Nilsson, Serafin, & Nordahl, 2014), postural stability (Duh, Lin, 
Kenyon, Parker, & Furness, 2001), reaching distance estimation (Watt, Bradshaw, & Rushton, 
2000), as well as simulator sickness (Lin, Duh, Parker, Abi-Rached, & Furness, 2002). 
Therefore, media form may influence the user’s performance in relation to both sensorimotor 
and intellectual challenges that, in turn, help determine whether challenge-based immersion is 
experienced. Alternately, this implies that system immersion may influence the experience of 
challenge-based immersion. Table 4 summarizes the definitions of immersion pertaining to a 
user’s mental absorption brought about by the experience of challenges requiring mental or 
sensorimotor skills.  
 
Table 4.  Immersion as a Reaction to Challenges in Terms of Form, Content, and User Response. 
Terms Form Content User response 
Challenge-based immersion 
(Ermi & Mäyrä, 2005) 
While the effects of form are 
not explicitly addressed by 
the authors, it seems likely 
that it may be influential 
(e.g., whether practice is 
necessary in order to use 
the controls or displays). 
Results from confrontations 
with nontrivial challenges 
that lie within one’s capacity 
for action. 
Intense and focused 
attention on the challenge  
at hand. 
Strategic immersion (Adams 
& Rollings, 2006) 
It is possible that form may 
be influential (e.g., the type 
of visual display may 
influence challenges 
involving spatial perception, 
such as navigation tasks). 
Results from challenges 
demanding use of one’s 
intellect. 
Intense and focused 
attention on an intellectual 
challenge. 
Tactical immersion (Adams 
& Rollings, 2006) 
It is possible that form may 
be influential (e.g., the 
precision and complexity of 
the peripherals may 
influence performance). 
Results from challenges 
demanding use of one’s 
sensorimotor skills. 
Intense and focused 
attention on evaluation of 
occurring obstacles and 
responding with appropriate 
actions. 
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A Taxonomy of Existing Conceptualizations of Immersion  
 
We propose that the conceptualizations of immersion presented throughout the preceding 
subsections may be organized into a taxonomy with three dimensions. The presented 
definitions may be divided broadly into three categories based on whether they relate to 
immersion as a property of the system (system immersion), a subjective response to narrative 
(narrative immersion) or a subjective response to challenges (challenge-based immersion). 
Thus, the proposed taxonomy bears resemblance with the SCI-model proposed by Ermi and 
Mäyrä’s (2005) that distinguished between the previously described notions of sensory, 
challenge-based, and imaginative immersion. An important difference is that the current 
taxonomy does not include immersion as a response to being enveloped by technology, that 
is, sensory immersion (Ermi & Mäyrä, 2005) or perceptual immersion (McMahan, 2003). 
The reason for this perspective is twofold. First, the intensity of this form of immersion 
increases proportionally with an increase in system immersion. Therefore, its inclusion does 
not add any significant descriptive power. Second, this view of immersion considerably 
overlaps with at least one existing view of presence, which is addressed in the Immersion and 
Illusions of Place and Plausibility subsection below. Moreover, the proposed taxonomy 
somewhat resembles the previously outlined categories of immersion proposed by Adams 
and Rollings (2006), that is, narrative, tactile, and strategic immersion. Specifically, we 
consider challenges to both one’s intellect (strategic immersion) and sensorimotor skills 
(tactical immersion) to be subcategories of challenge-based immersion. Finally, we use the 
term narrative immersion in a manner similar to Ryan (2003) and Arsenault (2005) in that 
this type of immersion can be subdivided into spatial, temporal and emotional immersion.  
It is possible to represent the three dimensions of the proposed taxonomy as axes in a 
coordinate system (Figure 1) in a manner similar to how Zeltzer (1992) visualized the 
relationship between autonomy, interaction, and presence. The three subcategories of narrative 
immersion (spatial, temporal, and emotional) are collapsed into one axis because an intense 
preoccupation with the unfolding narrative may be caused by more than one of the three 
subcategories simultaneously. The same is true for the axis challenge-based immersion, which 
may be influenced by both intellectual and sensorimotor challenges. The xz-plane represents 
variations in the subjective experience of immersion, while the y-axis represents changes to the 
system that may influence the subject experience. By considering the cube subtended by the 
three axes, we are able to provide an account of the experiences generated from combinations 
of the three types of immersion.  
 The origin 0,0,0 corresponds to a unmediated experience, or one relying on a very 
low fidelity system, devoid of both interesting narrative contents and obstacles 
posing a noteworthy challenge (e.g., waiting for someone in an empty parking lot).  
 The corner 0,1,0 represents a scenario that is equally trivial, despite the user being 
technologically immersed (e.g., waiting for someone on an empty virtual parking lot). 
It is possible that a novice VE user will experience some degree of preoccupation with 
the virtual world due to the sheer novelty of the simulated parking lot. However, such 
an instance of mental absorption can be attributed to the experience of some degree 
of spatial immersion.  
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Figure 1.  Illustration of the proposed taxonomy of existing conceptualizations of immersion. 
The three axes represent the extent to which interaction with a system involves system 
immersion (vertical), narrative immersion (horizontal), and challenge-based immersion (depth). 
The degree to which each type of immersion is presented is represented on a scale from 0 to 1, 
where 0 represent absence and 1 represents the highest possible level of immersion. 
 
 The points 0,0,1 and 1,0,0 both represent situations involving close-to-no technological 
immersion but a high degree of narrative immersion (e.g., a great work of literary 
fiction) or challenge-based immersion (e.g., a Sudoku puzzle or a game of foosball).  
 Fantasy roleplaying games, such as Dungeons and Dragons, may be used to 
illustrate the experience corresponding to the coordinate set 1,0,1. Such games need 
not involve explicit use of technology; players may experience narrative immersion 
when they assume the role of a character in an unfolding story or in challenge-
based immersion due to the mental skills required to tackle the fictional challenges.  
 The points 0,1,1 and 1,1,0 correspond both to video games running on technologically 
immersive systems capable of delivering high-fidelity tracking and sensor stimuli in 
several modalities. In the case of point 0,1,1, the game would involve an ideal balance 
between intellectual or sensorimotor challenges and the player’s capacity for action. In 
the case of point 1,1,0, the game would present the player with an interactive narrative 
that strongly appeals to the player’s curiosity to know more about the ongoing events, 
the fate of the virtual characters, or the virtual space itself.  
 Finally, the corner 1,1,1 might correspond to a video game running on a 
technologically immersive system but involving both obstacles posing a suitable 
challenge and an interesting story. 
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IMMERSION AND VARIETIES OF PRESENCE 
 
A defining feature of VEs is arguably the ability to elicit a compelling sensation of presence 
inside the computer-generated environment. However, like immersion, the concept presence 
becomes synonymous with a variety of different experiences, and the two terms often are 
used interchangeably. In this section, we introduce the concept of presence and discuss how 
four views of presence may relate to system immersion, narrative immersion, and challenge-
based immersion. 
 
Presence at a Glance 
 
Many credit Minsky (1980) for coining the term telepresence, describing the sensation of “being 
there” in some remote location while perceiving and acting vicariously through a robot. According 
to Riva (2009), the term presence first entered the broad scientific debate when Sheridan and 
Furness founded the journal Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments. In the second 
issue of the journal, Sheridan (1992) presented a comparable definition of telepresence and added 
that an individual similarly may experience a sensation of being physically present during 
exposure to multisensory stimuli generated by a computer. Since then, the term has been used 
within a variety of academic domains (e.g., communication, cognitive science, computer science, 
engineering, philosophy, psychology), to describe a variety of experiential phenomena. This is 
perhaps best exemplified by Lombard and Ditton’s (1997) seminal taxonomy of presence, which 
outlined six different, yet interrelated, forms of presence: presence as social richness, presence as 
realism, presence as transportation, presence as immersion, presence as social actor within 
medium, and presence as medium as social actor. Based on the writings of fellow scholars, 
Lombard and Ditton (1997) proposed a definition of presence they believed to be broad enough to 
include the various existing conceptualizations of presence. They defined presence as “the 
perceptual illusion of nonmediation” (Lombard & Ditton, 1997, “Presence Explicated,” para. 1). 
The failure of the individual to acknowledge the mediated nature of an experience is similarly 
reflected in the definition of presence endorsed by the International Society for Presence Research 
(ISPR). In their explication statement, ISPR presented the following definition of presence: 
Presence (a shortened version of the term “telepresence”) is a psychological state or 
subjective perception in which even though part or all of an individual’s current experience 
is generated by and/or filtered through human-made technology, part or all of the 
individual’s perception fails to accurately acknowledge the role of the technology in the 
experience. (ISPR, 2000, “The Concept of Presence: Explication Statement,” Point 1). 
Notably, the technology needs not comprise only high-fidelity displays and tracking, but also 
may refer to representational media, such as television, photographs, paintings, sculptures, and 
traditional print media (ISPR, 2000). In line with the conceptualization of system immersion, 
these technologies are not equally immersive because they vary in terms of the extent to which 
they deliver multisensory displays and are able translate the movements of the individual into 
virtual actions. Indeed, the question of whether presence is influenced by system immersion and 
factors such as mental imagery space and attention have spurred various theories of presence. In 
the balance of this section, four theories of presence will be introduced and their relation to our 
taxonomy of existing views of immersion will be discussed. The four theories are (a) Biocca’s 
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(2003) three-pole model of presence shifts that, among other things, attempted to explain why 
textual media such as books can elicit a sensation of presence; (b) E. L. Waterworth and 
Waterworth’s (2001) three-dimensional model of attention during virtual experience, which 
introduced the notion of absence so as to explain experiences devoid of presence; (c) Riva, 
Waterworth, and Waterworth’s (2004) account of how the presence may be described as a 
three-layered bio-cultural mechanism that helps the self in making sense of sensory stimulation; 
and (d) Slater’s (2009) conceptual framework for describing how the combination of system 
immersion, virtual body-ownership, and illusions of place and plausibility make individuals 
respond realistically to virtual worlds. 
 
Immersion, Presence, and Mental Imagery Spaces 
 
Biocca (2003) proposed the so-called three-pole model of presence shifts. Biocca believed two 
central assumptions in the existing presence theories to be flawed, namely, the two-pole 
assumption and the sensorimotor immersion assumption. The former relates to the belief that an 
individual’s sensation of presence can alternate between two states. Either one feels present 
within the physical environment or one feels present within the virtual (or remote) environment. 
The sensorimotor assumption stipulates that the main causes of presence are the immersive 
properties of the technology, that is, system immersion. Biocca (2003) found that the two-pole 
assumption was unable to explain how presence can occur during everyday encounters with the 
world and while dreaming because these experiences do not involve system immersion. 
Additionally, the sensorimotor assumption made it difficult to explain why individuals seemingly 
can experience presence while exposed to low-fidelity, noniconic media such as books.  
In order to alleviate these problems, Biocca added a third pole, dubbed mental imagery 
space. Biocca’s argument for doing so was that the spatial models produced by mental imagery 
possess analog properties similar to those of sensorimotor spaces and may rely on neural 
mechanisms related to spatial perception (Kosslyn, 1983, 1996; Kosslyn & Koenig, 1992). 
Assuming that the sensation of presence is defined by a mental model of space, then presence 
may gradually shift between the physical and virtual environment as well as the mental imagery 
space, depending on which of the three supplies the mental model with spatial cues (Biocca, 
2003). Finally, Biocca proposed that shifts between imagery space and stimulus-driven spaces 
(virtual and physical environments) are governed largely by spatial attention. Shifts between 
the physical and virtual environments are attributed to spatial updating, that is, primarily 
sensory-driven cognitive processes responsible for updating the mental model of positions of 
objects relative to the perceiver during movement (Biocca, 2003). 
Despite the emphasis of mental imagery space, Biocca’s (2003) view does not appear to 
contradict the claim that system immersion may be conducive to the sensation of presence (the 
circle labeled A in Figure 2). Biocca theorized that spaces generated from mental imagery are 
inferior to VEs in terms of sensory resolution, the salience of memory, and intersubjective 
consistency. However, it would seem that the focus of spatial attention needs to be leveled at the 
mediated environment in order for the user to feel present within the VE. Thus, the sensation of 
presence within a VE devoid of an interesting narrative or challenging obstacles may be fragile 
because shifts in spatial attention are more likely to occur. In turn, this implies that the 
combination of system immersion and the mental absorption characterizing narrative immersion is 
likely to elicit a sensation of presence (Circle B in Figure 2). A defining characteristic of Biocca’s  
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Figure 2.  Illustration of how the different types of immersion may elicit a sensation of 
presence following Biocca’s (2003) three-pole model of presence shifts. The grey circles 
represent instances believed to elicit presence. The three axes represent the extent to which 
interaction with a system involves system immersion (vertical), narrative immersion 
(horizontal), and challenge-based immersion (depth). The degree of each type of immersion  
is represented on a scale from 0 to 1, where 0 represents absence and  
1 represents the highest possible level of immersion. 
 
 
view of presence is that textual media such as books can elicit a sensation of presence. Thus, 
narrative immersion and its subcategories (temporal, spatial and emotional) may be particularly 
important to the sensation of being there in the diegetic space (Circle C in Figure 2). While 
Biocca (2003) did not explicitly describe the role emotions play in relation to presence, the 
model indirectly suggests that emotions may contribute to the sensation of being there in VR. 
To elaborate, it is a widely held belief that affect may bias both perception and attention and 
that individuals generally assign greater importance to emotionally salient stimuli (Fox, 2008). 
Thus, it seems likely that narrative events, characters, or locations capable of eliciting emotional 
responses might reduce the risk of shifts in presence from the VR to the external environment. 
Moreover, it is worth recalling that Ryan (2003, p. 122) stated that, when experiencing intense 
spatial immersion, “the reader develops an intimate relation to the setting as well as a sense of 
being present on the scene of the represented events.” Thus, spatial immersion resulting from 
textual narratives appears largely identical to Biocca’s description of the experience of presence 
arising from spatial cues originating within one’s mental imagery space. Moreover, Biocca 
(2003, p. 7) described that when “action in space involves high spatial attention to sensory 
stimuli (e.g., learning a new motor task or during fight–or–flight), spatial presence is focused 
and undivided on one consistent spatial model driven by physical or virtual space.” This 
suggests that challenge-based immersion also may contribute to the sensation of presence 
during exposure to technologically immersive VEs (Circle D in Figure 2). 
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Immersion and the Focus, Locus and Sensus of Attention  
 
E. L. Waterworth and Waterworth (2001) generally conform to the view that presence is 
tantamount to the sensation of being there within an environment. They characterized presence 
as “a conscious emphasis on direct perception of currently present stimuli rather than on 
conceptual processing” (p. 211). While these authors acknowledged that system immersion 
may increase the sensation of presence, they raised the question of whether a high degree of 
technological envelopment always will yield a strong sensation of being in the VE. In order 
to approach an answer to this question, Waterworth and Waterworth (2001) proposed a model 
describing virtual experiences in terms of three dimensions pertaining to the individual’s 
allocation of attentional resources. The three dimensions are focus of attention, locus of 
attention and sensus of attention. The first dimension pertains directly to presence in that 
presence is believed to arise when an individual primarily attends to the immediate real or 
virtual environment within and around the body. The amount of attentional resources 
allocated to the immediate environment depends on the extent to which the given situation 
requires conceptual processing, that is, abstract reasoning. If the situation demands a low 
degree of conceptual processing, the individual can focus on direct perceptual processing of 
the environment. On the other hand, if the situation requires a high degree of abstract 
reasoning, the resources allocated for perceptual processing are low and the individual enters 
a state of absence rather than presence. Thus, presence constitutes one extreme of the 
dimension of focus and absence forms the other extreme. The second dimension, locus of 
attention, relates to whether the individual currently allocates attention to the virtual or the 
external environment. Finally, the dimension sensus of attention relates to the degree of 
conscious arousal experienced by the individual. Waterworth and Waterworth (2001) 
described conscious arousal as a basic physiological response to significant external stimulus 
and use the state of dreamless sleep as an example of low very low-conscious arousal. 
J. A. Waterworth and Waterworth (2003) noted that the dimension focus of attention 
implies that presence is a function of media form. A technologically immersive system 
provides concrete information that can be processed directly by the perceptual–motor systems, 
unlike abstract information, which is realized mentally (e.g., an imagined world is contingent 
upon abstract information). Thus, their view of presence supports the assertion that some 
degree of system immersion is a prerequisite for the sensation of presence within VR (the circle 
labeled A in Figure 3). However, because mental acts involving conceptual processing, such 
as daydreaming, are believed to hamper the direct perceptual processing necessary for 
presence, it seems plausible that narrative- and challenge-based immersion might contribute 
positively to the sensation of presence within the VE. Narrative immersion may be influential 
insofar as it involves explicit assignment of attention to the ongoing events, rather than 
contemplating the nature of these (Circle B, Figure 3). Waterworth and Waterworth (2003) 
explicitly stated that presence should not be confused with emotionality or level of interest. 
However, it does seem plausible that emotionally salient stimuli originating within the VE 
might entail allocation of resources to direct perceptual processing, thereby indirectly 
influencing the sensation of presence. Finally, it also seems plausible that challenge-based 
immersion may be of influence. The immersion accompanying intellectual challenges are likely 
to give rise to conceptual processing, which thereby results in absence. However, sensorimotor 
challenges might have the reverse effect. Such challenges will require the individual to focus  
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Figure 3.  Illustration of how the different types of immersion may elicit a sensation of 
presence following E. L Waterworth and Waterworth’s (2003) three dimensions of virtual 
experience. The grey circles represent instances believed to elicit presence. The three axes 
represent the extent to which interaction with a system involves system immersion (vertical), 
narrative immersion (horizontal), and challenge-based immersion (depth). The degree to 
which each type of immersion is presented is represented on a scale from 0 to 1, where 0 
represent absence and 1 represents the highest possible level of immersion. 
 
 
entirely on reacting to obstacles represented within the environment, which implies that the 
attentional resources are almost entirely devoted to direct perceptual processing (Circle C, 
Figure 3). 
 
Layers of Presence 
 
Riva and colleagues have proposed that the sensation of presence within real and virtual 
environments can be described in terms of layers of presence (Riva, 2009; Riva et al., 2004;  
Riva, Waterworth, Waterworth, & Mantovani, 2011). This proposition can be viewed in some 
capacity as an extension of E. L. Waterworth and Waterworth’s (2001) description of virtual 
experiences in terms of the focus, locus, and sensus of attention. To be exact, it helps explain 
how focus might shift to produce a state of either presence or absence (Riva et al., 2004). 
Riva et al. (2004) described presence as a bio-cultural mechanism that has evolved to 
help the self-making sense of perceived sensory data. Thus, presence may be the feeling that 
makes it possible for an individual to separate external percepts from internal mental 
constructions composed of imagined events and situations (Riva et al., 2004). The authors 
argued that, despite being experienced as a unitary feeling, it is possible to distinguish 
between three separate layers of presence associated with each of the three levels of the self, 
as proposed by Damasio (1999). In addition to drawing on the work of Damasio (1999), the 
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notions core consciousness and extended consciousness are central to Riva et al.’s (2004) 
description of how the three layers of presence impact one’s experience of the surrounding 
environment. Core consciousness essentially refers to the basic integrated representation of 
the current environment. This level of consciousness may be shared across many species and 
be independent of language, reasoning, and memory (Riva et al., 2004). Extended 
consciousness is believed to rely largely on working memory and enables the individual to 
form and attend to internal worlds. Also, it makes it possible for the individual to consider 
possibilities extending beyond the current external situation (Riva et al., 2004).  
The three layers of presence proposed by Riva et al. (2004) are proto presence, core 
presence, and extended presence. Proto presence is viewed as a mostly unconscious 
embodied presence that helps distinguish the self from the nonself through the coupling of 
perception and action. Thus, proto presence relies heavily on kinesthetic information about 
the relative position of the body in space. A high level of coupling between performed 
movements and perceptions will result in a large degree of differentiation between the self 
and the surrounding environment. The second layer, core presence, is described as the 
process of selective attention performed by the self on perceptions. When a large degree of 
attention is assigned to sensorial experiences, other neural processes are left in the 
background, leaving room for identification of the present moment and the tasks at hand. 
Finally, extended presence helps establish the significance of external events with respect to 
the self and thereby helps ensure that the self is present in significant experiences. When the 
three layers are integrated and leveled at a particular situation, this may give rise to what Riva 
et al. (2004) refer to as proto consciousness. When the contents of proto, core, and extended 
consciousness are aligned, then maximal presence is experienced, that is, the outermost 
extreme of the focus dimension described by E. L. Waterworth and Waterworth (2001). 
Contrarily, the other extreme of focus (i.e., absence) may arise when the current environment 
occupies a very small part of extended consciousness (Riva et al., 2004).  
Riva et al.’s (2004) theory may, as suggested, be considered an elaboration on E. L. 
Waterworth and Waterworth’s (2001) description of how the focus, locus, and sensus of 
attention influence virtual experiences. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that the relation 
between the two theories and the new taxonomy is similar (see Figure 3). Riva et al. (2004) 
argued that print media and verbal accounts primarily engage extended consciousness and are 
unable to produce core or proto presence. For that reason, the integration of the three layers of 
presence is limited. Media forms relying more heavily on visual imagery, such as photographs 
or film, may to a larger extent elicit core presence. However, given their inability to support 
action‒perception coupling, proto presence will be low. Indeed, it would seem that Riva et al.’s 
(2004) theory of presence suggested that a relatively high degree of system immersion may be a 
prerequisite for a maximal experience of presence within VR. In order for all three layers to be 
integrated, it is necessary to elicit proto presence, which is said to function on the level of 
proprioception, and spatial and internal monitoring (Riva et al., 2004). Considering that high 
levels of system immersion will enable the user to naturally perceive and interact within a 
computer-generated environment, such systems should support proto presence. However, it 
would seem that system immersion will not always suffice because the integration of all three 
layers is important for maximal presence. To elaborate, extended presence requires content that 
is either emotionally or intellectually significant. Thus, a virtual environment devoid of 
significant contents will be less likely to elicit a strong sensation of presence. Both narrative 
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immersion and challenge-based immersion are arguably accompanied by extended presence 
because an individual experiencing these types of immersion, by definition, is mentally absorbed 
by the unfolding narrative or the obstacles within the environment. As it happens, Riva et al. 
(2004) highlighted that narratives may be crucial when one wishes to design for optimal 
presence. However, they stressed that, in order for narratives to positively influence the 
sensation of presence, the user will have to assume the role of a character and inhabit the story. 
Similarly, the authors suggested that maximal presence bears semblance to the concept of flow. 
The characteristics of a flow state include intense and focused attention and a merging of action 
and awareness. Similarly, maximal presence may be experienced when proto, core, and 
extended consciousness are leveled at the same external event. Because challenge-based 
immersion in many regards corresponds to the state of flow, it seems likely that this form of 
immersion also would be conductive to presence as it is described by Riva et al. (2004). 
 
Immersion and Illusions of Place and Plausibility 
 
Slater and colleagues described presence as the phenomena occurring when individuals respond 
to virtual stimuli in the same way as they would when exposed to equivalent unmediated 
stimuli (Sanchez-Vives & Slater, 2005; Slater, Lotto, Arnold, & Sánchez-Vives, 2009). More 
specifically, this response should be similar on every level, “from unconscious physiological 
behaviors, through automatic reactions, conscious volitional behaviors, through to cognitive 
processing—including the sensation of being there” (Sanchez-Vives & Slater, 2005, p. 338). 
Thus, the sensation of presence makes up the subjective experience of a realistic response to 
virtually generated stimuli, that is, a response that would be identical if the stimuli were 
unmediated. Notably, Slater refined this theory of users’ responses to VEs by suggesting that 
the sensation of being there is not the sole factor in determining whether an individual responds 
realistically to virtual stimuli (Rovira, Swapp, Spanlang, & Slater, 2009; Slater, 2009). Slater 
(2009) presented the hypothesis that this response-as-if-real can be ascribed to the simultaneous 
occurrence of not one but two perceptual illusions: the place illusion—the illusion that you are 
really there despite the sure knowledge that you are not—and the plausibility illusion—the 
illusion that the unfolding events are really happening in spite of the knowledge that they are 
not. Combined with notions of immersion and a virtual body, the place and plausibility 
illusions make up a conceptual framework for explaining how VEs potentially can transform 
our experience of space and ourselves (Slater, 2009). 
Slater (2009) reserves the term place illusion for the type of presence that refers to the 
qualia of being there despite knowing that one really is not. Qualia can simply be understood as 
“the way things seem to us” (Dennett, 1988, p. 381). Slater (2003) eloquently used the 
relationship between the wavelength distribution of light and color perception as a metaphor to 
describe the connection between immersion and presence. Just as a color can be objectively 
described based on its wavelength distribution, so can immersion be described based on 
objective properties, such as frame rate, fidelity of tracking, or the size of the field of view. 
Even though wavelength distribution and immersion are objectively describable, they both lead 
to subjective experiences, namely, perceived color and illusions of place. Slater (2009) argued 
that one may characterize an immersive system by the sensorimotor contingencies it supports. 
Sensorimotor contingencies correspond to the actions that the user knows how to perform when 
attempting to perceive, such as, turning one’s head in order to change the gaze direction or 
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taking a step forwards in order to more closely inspect an object. Slater (2009) went on to 
describe that the place illusion occurs as a function of the range of normal sensorimotor 
contingencies facilitated by the system. While system immersion is an objectively measurable 
quantity, presence is not. Thus, it is entirely possible for two individuals to experience different 
levels of presence despite being exposed to the same immersive system. The difference in 
experienced presence need not be caused by individual differences. Instead, a difference in the 
actions performed by the two individuals might be responsible for the variations in the 
sensations of presence. One person might explore the environment to a larger extent than the 
other: for example, by picking up and inspecting objects and thereby testing the limits of the 
system (Slater 2009). Notably, there is a considerable overlap between Slater’s place illusion 
and existing definitions of immersion (e.g., general definition of immersion, Witmer & Singer, 
1998; perceptual immersion, McMahan, 2003; and sensory immersion, Ermi & Mäyrä, 2005). 
In other words, these definitions hold that immersion corresponds to the subjective sensation of 
being enveloped by and included in the VE’s mediated via high-fidelity tracking and displays. 
For that reason, it may not be particularly fruitful to rely on these definitions of immersion 
following this view of presence (Slater 1999). 
Unlike place illusion, plausibility illusion is not the direct result of an individual’s ability 
to perceive the VE. Instead, this perceptual illusion arises as a result of what the individual 
perceives within the environment. Specifically, the plausibility illusion occurs when the 
unfolding events are experienced as actually occurring, despite the certain knowledge that 
they are not (Slater, 2009). Rovira et al. (2009) indicated that the plausibility illusion depends 
on the VE meeting at least three conditions: (a) The actions performed by the user must 
produce correlated reactions within the VE (e.g., a virtual character might avoid eye contact 
and step aside if the user stares or exhibits aggressive body language); (b) The environment 
should respond directly to the user, even when the user is not performing an instigating action 
(e.g., a virtual character might react to the presence of the user without the user initially 
approaching or addressing this character); and (c) The environment and the events occurring 
within it should be credible, that is, they should conform to the user’s knowledge and 
expectations accrued through a lifetime of unmediated interactions.  
Slater’s (2009) distinction between the place and plausibility illusion bears resemblance 
with Lombard and Ditton’s conceptualization of presence as realism. Lombard and Ditton 
(1997) distinguished between two forms of realism that may contribute to the experience of 
presence, whether perceived in isolation or in concert, namely social realism and perceptual 
realism. Perceptual realism refers to the extent to which mediated artifacts appear like their 
real-world counterparts; social realism refers to “the extent to which a media portrayal is 
plausible or true to life, as it reflects events that do or could occur in the nonmediated world” 
(Lombard & Ditton, 1997, “Presence as Realism,” para. 1). While place illusion need not be 
contingent upon visual realism (Sanchez-Vives & Slater, 2005), plausibility illusion shares 
some commonalities with social realism.  
Slater (2009) described the body as the focal point where the illusions of place and 
plausibility are fused. During everyday interactions within unmediated environments, we 
humans continuously receive sensory information about our bodies. Slater (2009) argued that 
this ability to perceive ourselves serves as a strong confirmation of the place illusion. That is 
to say, if we are able to perceive our body then we must be there. The ability to provide users 
of VEs with a credible virtual body is therefore central to eliciting illusions of place. 
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On the topic of the relationship between Slater’s conceptual framework and the taxonomy 
outlined earlier in this paper, it is evident that system immersion is viewed as the principal 
determinant for compelling place illusions (the circle labeled A in Figure 4). That is, the place 
illusion should increase as the range of natural sensorimotor contingencies supported by the 
system increases. Consequently, it may seem puzzling that individuals report experiencing a 
sense of being there after engaging with lower order immersive systems, such as a first-person 
video game played on a desktop system. When attempting to explain this predicament, Slater 
(2009) hypothesized that the types of presence brought about by lower and higher order 
immersive systems are qualitatively different. The illusion of being there elicited by systems 
providing a high level of system immersion happens as a consequence of exposure to the 
sensory stimuli. Contrarily, Slater (2009) provided the following account of the experience 
accompanying desktop systems: 
In the case of a desktop system the situation is quite different; the feeling reported as 
“being there” if it comes at all is after much greater exposure, requires deliberate 
attention and is not automatic—it is not simply a function of how the perceptual system 
normally works, but is something that essentially needs to be learned, and may be 
regarded as more complex. (Slater, 2009, p. 3552). 
Some of Slater and colleagues’ early work on walking-in-place locomotion arguably lend 
some credence to this claim. Slater, Usoh, and Steed (1995) found that the subjective sensation 
of presence was higher on behalf of subjects walking in place rather than pressing a button to 
 
 
Figure 4.  Illustration of how the different types of immersion may elicit a sensation of presence 
following Slater’s (2009) framework. The grey circle represents instances believed to elicit 
presence. The three axes represent the extent to which interaction with a system involves 
system immersion (vertical), narrative immersion (horizontal), and challenge-based immersion 
(depth). The degree to which each type of immersion is presented is represented on a scale from 
0 to 1, where 0 represent absence and 1 represents the highest possible level of immersion. 
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generate virtual movement. Usoh et al. (1999) confirmed these findings and also found that real 
walking is better than the two other input methods in terms of simplicity, straightforwardness, 
and naturalness. Even though locomotion methods allowing users’ to rely on natural gestures 
may elicit stronger illusions of place than lower order systems, it would seem that players may 
exhibit emotional responses similar to those experienced in real life when interacting with 
lower order immersive systems. One example is the emotions experienced by phobic patients 
who play video games as treatment for their phobias (Bouchard, Côté, St-Jacques, Robillard, & 
Renaud, 2006). 
Following this view of users’ responses to VEs, narrative immersion and its three 
subcategories (temporal, spatial, and emotional) appear to have no effect on the place illusion. 
These forms of immersion are characterized by the user becoming mentally absorbed by the 
unfolding narrative, the diegetic space, and the characters inhabiting this space. The user’s 
attraction toward, or aversion to, the sight, sound, and feeling of the virtual world is obviously 
relevant to the study of user experiences of VEs. However, these are matters of content rather 
than form, and they are therefore deemed inconsequential for the experience of presence 
following this view. To borrow an example from Slater (2003), imagine listening to a live 
recording of Bach’s Toccata and Fugue in D minor on a high-end surround system. You do not 
need to be a classical music aficionado to experience the sensation of being in the concert hall. 
However, if you favor heavy metal, it is unlikely that you will find a similar situational 
experience enjoyable or involving. Thus, it would seem that narrative immersion should not be 
considered a factor contributing to illusions of place as described by Slater (2009). Finally, it is 
unlikely that challenge-based immersion is a factor influencing the place illusion, as introduced 
by Slater (2009). While the experience of challenge-based immersion will entail allocation of 
attention to the virtual obstacles, this does not mean that presence is experienced. As in real 
life, one may find a particular virtual task boring, enjoyable, or aggravating due to its difficulty 
level, but that has nothing to do with whether one feels present or not. This being said, one may 
argue that there might be one way in which narratives and challenges indirectly can influence 
the place illusion. Because the extent to which users probe the bounds of the immersive system 
might influence presence, it seems possible that the risk of too close inspection can be reduced 
by means of narrative contents and challenges explicitly designed to discourage users from 
performing undesired actions.  
 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH OR APPLICATION 
 
The general aim of our research has been to explicate the different meanings associated with 
the term immersion and to clarify how these relate to varying views of presence. A better 
understanding of the similarities and differences between theories of presence and immersion 
may have implications for how scholars and researchers approach the study of these areas and 
for developers who seek to elicit and evaluate such experiences. 
The current ambiguous and interchangeable use of terminology related to immersion and 
presence in the literature often results in a mismatch between the phenomena scholars wish to 
study and the methods they end up employing. For example, one theory of immersion or 
presence is taken as a point of departure but, in the data collection and/or analysis, the 
employed metrics are devised based on a different view of the concepts. Thus, clarified 
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knowledge of the theories pertaining to immersion and presence will help students, researchers, 
and developers to make well-informed decisions when consulting the literature, and thereby 
ensure correspondence between the theoretical underpinnings of a given project, design 
decisions, and the employed evaluation method. Specifically, the proposed taxonomy offers a 
useful starting point for both individuals who are entirely new to the concepts immersion and 
presence, and individuals that are just familiar with how the terms are used in a specific 
domain (e.g., video game studies or VE research). This is particularly relevant considering 
that technologically immersive virtual reality is becoming increasingly widespread and video 
games are a primary application area of such technology. Thus, game researchers are 
increasingly likely to need an understanding of the theory familiar to researchers working 
with VEs and vice versa. Moreover, immersive technologies are also being adopted by 
researchers and developers working within a variety of different fields, including health care 
and education, and the work documented in the current paper will serve as a valuable 
introduction to such individuals. Finally, because we propose that the different views on the 
concepts immersion and presence each have their merits, our work may help inform potential 
future research questions on behalf of scholars studying both video games and VEs: For 
instance, how does system immersion influence challenge-based and narrative immersion, 
and how can narrative elements and challenges be used to subtly prevent the user from 
probing the bounds of the system in a manner that disrupts the sensation of presence. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Through the research documented in the current paper, we sought to address two primary 
questions: What meanings are associated with the term immersion and how do these meanings 
map onto existing views of presence? In order to address these questions, we presented a 
review of existing definitions of immersion related to VEs, video games, and literary works of 
fiction and, based on this review, a taxonomy of different conceptualizations of immersion was 
proposed. Specifically, this taxonomy organizes existing definitions of immersion along three 
orthogonal dimensions: (a) immersion as a property of the system, (b) immersion as a response 
to an unfolding narrative, the diegetic space, or virtual characters, and (c) immersion as a 
response to challenges demanding use of one’s intellect or sensorimotor skills. The first is an 
objectively measurable property of the system whereas the last two are characterized by an 
experience of intense and focused attention on events in the virtual world. Most existing 
categorizations of immersion are aligned with one of these two descriptions; that is, immersion 
is either an objective property of the system or a subjective state of the user. The proposed 
taxonomy illustrates that such dissimilar views need not be a source of ambiguity, but rather 
these can be used to describe various features of users’ interactions with VEs. However, it is 
exactly because most existing views of immersion have their merits that researchers and 
developers need to clearly specify what they mean when using the term immersion. Taxonomies 
such as the one proposed in this paper should make this task easier. 
The four theories of presence outlined in the current paper all relate to the sensation of being 
in a given virtual (or unmediated) environment. However, they differ in terms of the factors 
believed to influence presence. Particularly, the theories differ in regard to the importance 
assigned to mental imagery and the degree of explicit attention assigned to the sensory stimuli 
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depicting the environment. Biocca (2003) did not view system immersion to be a prerequisite for 
the illusion of being there because presence is dependent on a mental model of space that can 
receive spatial cues from sources other than sensory perception. Thus, following this view, 
narrative immersion should positively influence the sensation of presence. Moreover, challenge-
based immersion may positively influence presence on behalf of users exposed to higher levels 
of system immersion insofar as the challenges help steer the user’s attention towards events in 
the virtual world. The theories proposed by E. L. Waterworth and Waterworth (2001) and Riva 
et al. (2004) assigned greater importance to system immersion because the sensation of presence 
is thought to be contingent upon information being processed directly by the perceptual–motor 
systems. Notably, it would seem that narrative immersion may positively influence the sensation 
of presence as described by both E. L. Waterworth and Waterworth (2001) and Riva et al. 
(2004). Narrative immersion entails intense and focused attention on the unfolding narrative 
events. Such attention should reduce the risk that users will engage in mental acts involving 
conceptual processing that takes away resources from the direct perceptual processing necessary 
for presence (J. A. Waterworth & Waterworth, 2003). Similarly, narrative immersion may 
influence presence as described by Riva et al. (2004) because emotionally or intellectually 
significant events may induce extended presence. Challenge-based immersion brought about by 
sensorimotor challenges may also indirectly influence the sensation of presence following the 
theories of Waterworth and Waterworth (2001) and Riva et al. (2004) because it involves 
allocation of attention to the events occurring within the environment. Finally, Slater (2009) 
argued that the sensation of being there within a VE (i.e., the place illusion) occurs as a function 
of the range of normal actions the user knows how to perform when attempting to perceive. 
Based on this account, it is apparent that system immersion is viewed as the principal factor 
determining whether presence is experienced. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the place 
illusion is viewed as being the same as system immersion. One user may perform actions that 
the system does not support, thus experiencing a different degree of the illusion than a user who 
does not probe the bounds of the system. Moreover, the narrative contents or the posed 
challenges may indirectly influence the place illusion by encouraging the user only to perform 
actions permitted by the system. Neither narrative immersion nor challenge-based immersion 
should be influential. Following this view, the illusion of place appears to be divorced from the 
individual’s interest in the activity being performed. A realistic response to virtual stimuli may 
be characterized equally well by indifference and excitement. Just as in real life, a user may find 
virtual events irrelevant, fascinating, challenging, or trivial, but that has nothing to do with 
whether the place illusion is experienced.  
In this paper, we have attempted to highlight the relatively large differences between 
existing views of what characterizes and causes presence. We believe it to be crucial that 
researchers and developers are mindful of these differences when interpreting the findings of 
others and when selecting what measures of presence to employ. Furthermore, because the 
terms presence and immersion have been used to refer to similar phenomena, a number of the 
methods developed to study some conceptualizations of presence may be applicable when 
studying psychological immersion and vice versa. In particular, both narrative and challenge-
based immersion are characterized by an experience of intense and focused attention on events 
in the virtual world. Similarly, some views of presence hold that the sense of being in the 
virtual space requires the user’s attention to be leveled at the virtual world. Thus, measures 
assessing presences in terms of allocation of attentional resources should also be applicable 
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when attempting to assess the degree to which narratives or challenges fully capture the user’s 
attention. To exemplify, IJsselsteijn, de Ridder, Freeman, and Avons (2000) described that 
the so-called secondary reaction time measure has been used to measure presence. The 
underlying assumption is that the user will react slower and produce more errors on a given 
secondary task, as compared to the primary task, if presence is experienced. Because such 
methods essentially operationalize presence in terms of allocation of attentional resources, 
they may also be used to assess the intensity of narrative and challenge-based immersion. 
Thus, knowledge of the differences and similarities between varying views of immersion and 
presence will enable students, researchers, and developers to make well-informed decisions 
when consulting the literature in search for design guidelines and evaluations methods.  
Even though the current paper does provide an overview of existing views of immersion 
and their relation to four theories of presence, it is possible to point to certain limitations of 
the work and propose potential directions for future research. Most notably, the literature 
review is not exhaustive, and therefore we cannot claim that all conceptualizations of 
immersion and presence have been covered. For that reason it would be meaningful for future 
work to adopt an approach similar to the one employed when performing critical reviews 
(Cook et al., 1997). That is, such a review should involve a comprehensive search of all 
potentially relevant work based on reproducible criteria. Other than providing a more 
complete picture, a critical review would also enable researchers to comment on the 
prevalence of various definitions of the terms across different domains and allow for the work 
to include a systematic review of the design principles and evaluation methods associated 
with different conceptualizations of immersion and presence. Moreover, it would be 
meaningful for future work to more explicitly include related terms such as engagement, 
absorption and involvement. Nevertheless, it is hard to argue why the term immersion is 
better suited to describe certain notions rather than others. Thus, we hope that the current 
review and the accompanying the taxonomy may offer clarity by making explicit the different 
conceptions of the term immersion and their relation to different theories of presence. 
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